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Abstract
We continue the study of Bochet et al. [4, 5] and Moulin and Sethuraman [20, 21] on fair
allocation in bipartite networks. In these models, there is a moneyless market, in which a
non-storable, homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked pref-
erences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. While the egalitarian rule of Bochet et
al. [4, 5] satisfies pareto optimality, no envy and strategyproof , it is not consistent. On the
other hand, the work of Moulin and Sethuraman [20, 21] is related to consistent allocations
and rules that are extensions of the uniform rule. We bridge the two streams of work by
introducing the edge fair mechanism which is both consistent and groupstrategyproof. On the
way, we explore the “price of consistency” i.e. how the notion of consistency is fundamentally
incompatible with certain notions of fairness like Lorenz Dominance and No-Envy. The current
work also introduces the idea of strong invariance as desideratum for groupstrategyproofness
and generalizes the proof of Chandramouli and Sethuraman [8] to a more broader class of
mechanisms. Finally, we conclude with the study of the edge fair mechanism in a transship-
ment model where the strategic agents are on the links connecting different supply/demand
locations.
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of fair division of a maximum flow in a capacitated bipartite network.
This model generalizes a number of matching and allocation problems that have been studied
extensively over the years, motivated by applications in school choice, kidney exchange etc. The
common feature in these application contexts is that the associated market is moneyless, so that
fairness is achieved by equalizing the allocation as much as possible. This last caveat is to account
for additional considerations, such as Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness, that may be part
of the planner’s objective.
Specifically, we are given a bipartite network G = (S ∪D,E), and we think of S as the set of
supply nodes and D as the set of demand nodes. Each arc (i, j) ∈ E connects a supply node i
to a demand node j, and has capacity uij ≥ 0. There is a single commodity (the resource) that
is available at the supply nodes and needs to be transferred to the demand nodes: we assume
that supply node i has si units of the resource, and demand node j requires dj units of it. The
capacity of an arc (i, j) is interpreted as an upper bound on the direct transfer from supply node
i to demand node j. The goal is to satisfy the demands “as much as possible” using the available
supplies, while also respecting the capacity constraints on the arcs.
A well-studied special case of our problem is that of allocating a single resource (or allocating
the resource available at a single location) amongst a set of agents with varying (objectively ver-
ifiable) claims on it. This is the special case when there is a single supply node that is connected
to every one of the demand nodes in the network by an arc of large-enough capacity. If the sum of
the claims of the agents exceeds the amount of the resource available, the problem is a standard
rationing problem (studied in the literature as “bankruptcy” problems or “claims” problems).
There is an extensive literature devoted to such problems that has resulted in a thorough under-
standing of many natural methods including the proportional method, the uniform gains method,
and the uniform losses method. A different view of this special case is that of allocating a single
resource amongst agents with single-peaked preferences over their net consumption. Under this
view, studied by Sprumont [26], Thomson [30] and many others, the goal is to design a mech-
anism for allocating the resource that satisfies appealing efficiency and equity properties, while
also eliciting the preferences of the agents truthfully. The uniform rule, which is essentially an
adaptation of the uniform gains method applied to the reported peaks of the agents, occupies a
central position in this literature: it is strategy-proof (in fact, group strategy-proof), and finds an
envy-free allocation that Lorenz dominates every other efficient allocation; furthermore, this rule
is also consistent. (We will define consistency, Lorenz dominance, etc. precisely in Section 2.) A
natural two-sided version of Sprumont’s model has agents initially endowed with some amount
of the resource, so that agents now fall into two categories: someone endowed with less than her
peak is a potential demander, whereas someone endowed with more than her peak is a potential
supplier. The simultaneous presence of demanders and suppliers creates an opportunity to trade,
and the obvious adaptation of the uniform rule gives their peak consumption to agents on the
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short side of the market, while those on the long side are uniformly rationed (see [16], [3]). This
is again equivalent to a standard rationing problem because the nodes on the short side of the
market can be collapsed to a single node. The model we consider generalizes this by assuming
that the resource can only be transferred between certain pairs of agents. Such constraints are
typically logistical (which supplier can reach which demander in an emergency situation, which
worker can handle which job request), but could be subjective as well (as when a hospital chooses
to refuse a new patient by declaring red status). This complicates the analysis of efficient (Pareto
optimal) allocations, because short demand and short supply typically coexist in the same market.
The general model we consider in this paper has been the subject of much recent research and
was first formulated by Bochet et al. [4, 5]. The authors work with a bipartite network in both
papers and assume that each node is populated by an agent with single-peaked preferences over his
consumption of the resource: thus, each supply node has an “ideal” supply (its peak) quantity, and
each demand node has an ideal demand. These preferences are assumed to be private information,
and Bochet et al. [4, 5] propose a clearinghouse mechanism that collects from each agent only
their “peaks” and picks Pareto-optimal transfers with respect to the reported peaks. Further,
they show that their mechanism is strategy-proof in the sense that it is a dominant strategy for
each agent to report their peaks truthfully. While the models in the two papers are very similar,
there is also a critical difference: in [5], the authors require that no agent be allowed to send or
receive any more than their peaks, whereas in [4] the authors assume that the demands must be
satisfied exactly (and so some supply nodes will have to send more than their peak amounts).
The mechanism of Bochet et al.—the egalitarian mechanism—generalizes the uniform rule, and
finds an allocation that Lorenz dominates all Pareto efficient allocations. Later, Chandramouli
and Sethuraman [8] show that the egalitarian mechanism is in fact group strategyproof: it is a
dominant strategy for any group of agents (suppliers or demanders) to report their peaks truthfully
1. Szwagrzak [27, 29, 28] expands the study of allocation rules in these networked economies by
introducing broader class of mechanisms with various fairness properties. His work also develops
alternative characterizations of these mechanisms (in p articular, the egalitarian mechanism) and
provides a unified view of the allocation problem on networks. Szwagrzak [27] studies the property
of contraction invariance of an allocation rule: when the set of feasible allocations contracts such
that the optimal allocation is still in this smaller set, then the allocation rule should continue
to select the same allocation. He shows that the egalitarian rule is contraction invariant. These
results suggest that the egalitarian mechanism may be the correct generalization of the uniform
rule to the network setting. However, it is fairly easy to show that the egalitarian mechanism
is not consistent: if the link from a supply node i and demand node j is dropped, and si and
dj are adjusted accordingly, applying the egalitarian mechanism to the reduced problem will not
necessarily give the same allocation to the agents. Motivated by this observation, Moulin and
1Szwagrzak [27] genrealize the proof methodology of Chandramouli and Sethuraman [8] to establish that all
separably convex rules are group strategyproof
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Sethuraman [20, 21] study rules for network rationing problems that extend a given rule for a
standard rationing problem while preserving consistency and other natural axioms. In particular,
they propose a family of rules that generalize the uniform rule to the bipartite network setting.
While they are able to show that their extension satisfies consistency, it is not known if any of
these rules is strategyproof.
Our main contribution in this paper is a new group strategy-proof mechanism (the “edge-
fair” mechanism) that is a consistent extension of the uniform rule. Our proof shows that for any
Pareto efficient mechanism, group strategyproofness is equivalent to a property that we call strong
invariance that is often straightforward to verify. (In particular, the group strategy-proofness of
the egalitarian mechanism that we established in an earlier paper also follows immediately, even
if one works with a capacitated model.) Along the way we show that consistency imposes very
severe restrictions: for instance, no consistent rule can find allocations that are envy-free, even in
the limited sense introduced by Bochet et al. [5] for such problems. The mechanism we propose
does not find the Lorenz optimal allocation, but we show that no consistent mechanism can.
We consider a related model where the supplies and demands at the nodes are given, but that
each edge is controlled by an independent agent with single-peaked preferences on the amount
transferred along that edge. The planner still wishes to implement a maximum flow (it is now a
design constraint), and the goal is to divide this reasonably among the edges of the network. For
this model we show that a Lorenz optimal allocation need not exist, but that our mechanism can
still be applied and finds a reasonable division of the max-flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we consider the standard model of
maximizing the total flow in a capacitated bipartite network. We state the well-known Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition, and describe the edge-fair algorithm that selects a particular max-flow
for any given problem. An easy argument shows that the edge-fair algorithm makes a consistent
selection of max-flows across related problems. Section 3 considers the model in which agents are
located on the nodes of the network and have single-peaked preferences over their allocations—the
equivalence of group strategy-proofness and strong invariance, and the fact that the edge-fair rule
satisfies strong invariance are the key results in this section. In section 4 we turn to the problem
in which agents are on the edges of the network, and study the implications of consistency.
2 Maximum Flows and the Edge-Fair Algorithm
2.1 Model
We consider the problem of transferring a single commodity from a set S of suppliers to a set D
of demanders using a set E of edges. Supplier i has si ≥ 0 units of the commodity, and demander
j wishes to consume dj ≥ 0. Associated with each edge is a distinct supplier-demander pair: the
edge e = (i, j) links supplier i to demander j, and has a non-negative, possibly infinite, capacity
uij . Transfer of the commodity is allowed between supplier i and demander j only if (i, j) ∈ E,
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in which case at most uij units of the commodity can be transferred along this edge
2. The goal
is to find an “optimal” transfer of the commodity from the suppliers to the demanders. We let
G = (S ∪D,E) be the natural bipartite graph and we speak of the problem (G, s, d, u).
We use the following notation. For any subset T ⊆ S, the set of demanders compatible with
the suppliers in T is f(T ) = {j ∈ D|(i, j) ∈ E, i ∈ T }. Similarly, the set of suppliers compatible
with the demanders in C ⊆ D is g(C) = {i ∈ S|(i, j) ∈ E, j ∈ C}. We abuse notation and
say f(i) and g(j) instead of f({i}) and g({j}) respectively. For any subsets T ⊆ S, C ⊆ D,
xT :=
∑
i∈T xi and yC :=
∑
j∈C yj.
A transfer of the commodity from S to D is realized by a flow ϕ, which specifies the amount
of the commodity transferred from supplier i to demander j using the edge (i, j) ∈ E. The flow
ϕ induces an allocation vector for each supplier and each demander as follows:
for all i ∈ S : xi(ϕ) =
∑
j∈f(i)
ϕij ; for all j ∈ D : yj(ϕ) =
∑
i∈g(j)
ϕij (1)
The flow ϕ is feasible if (i) ϕij ≤ uij for all (i, j) ∈ E and ϕij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ E; (ii) xi(ϕ) ≤ si
for all i ∈ S; and (iii) yj(ϕ) ≤ dj for all j ∈ D. Let F(G, s, d, u) be the set of feasible flows for
the problem (G, s, d, u). A feasible flow ϕ∗ is a maximum flow if
ϕ∗ ∈ arg max
ϕ∈F(G,s,d,u)
∑
i∈S
xi(ϕ).
Let F∗(G, s, d, u) be the set of maximum flows for the problem (G, s, d, u). For reasons that will
be clearer later, we shall focus mostly on finding a maximum flow for any given problem. As a
result, it is important to understand the set F∗(G, s, d, u), which we turn to next.
The Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition. The problem under consideration is the well-known
problem of finding a maximum flow in a capacitated bipartite network. The following result
characterizes the structure of maximum flows and is essentially a version of the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition. It can proved by a straightforward application of the max-flow min-cut theorem.
Lemma 1 There exists a partition S+, S− of S, and a partition D+,D− of D such that the flow
ϕ with net transfers x, y is a maximum flow if and only if
ϕij = uij ∀ij ∈ G(S−,D−), xi = si ∀i ∈ S+, yj = dj ∀j ∈ D+ (2)
Proof : Let λ := (λi)i∈S be non-negative. Construct the following network G(λ): introduce
a source s and a sink t; arcs of the form (s, i) for each supplier i with capacity λi, arcs of the form
(j, t) for each demander j with capacity dj ; an arc of capacity uij from supplier i to demander j
if supplier i and demander j share a link. Consider now a maximum s-t flow ϕ in the network
2Equivalently, we could assume that an edge exists between every supplier i and every demander j, but that
uij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ E.
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G(s). By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there is a cut C (a cut is a subset of nodes that contains
the source s but not the sink t) whose capacity is equal to that of the max-flow. Let X be the
set of suppliers in C and Y be the set of demanders in C. If the min-cut is not unique, it is again
well-known (see [17]) that there is a min-cut with the largest X (largest in the sense of inclusion),
and a min-cut with the smallest X (again in the sense of inclusion). Call these sets X and X.
Define S− := X and S+ := S \ S−; and define D+ = f(S−) ∩ {j|yj(ϕ) = dj, ∀ϕ ∈ F
∗} and
D− = D \D+. We note that the partition is uniquely determined for each problem.
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Let C be the cut that has precisely X as its set of suppliers and Y as its set of demanders. We
claim that Y ⊆ f(X). For otherwise, there is a supplier j ∈ Y \ f(X) who contributes dj to the
capacity of the cut C, and omitting j from C would reduce this capacity by dj > 0, resulting in
a smaller capacity cut. Moreover, by the max-flow min-cut theorem, every edge (i, j) with i ∈ C
and j 6∈ C must carry flow equal to its capacity, and that the value of the max-flow is precisely
the sum of the capacites of such edges. Thus, ϕij = uij for every edge (i, j) with i ∈ S− and
j ∈ D−; the edge (s, i) carries a flow of si for each supplier i ∈ S+; and the edge (j, t) carries a
flow of dj for each demander j ∈ D+. The lemma now follows.
2.2 Axioms
We briefly describe some key axioms that we want our rules to satisfy.
Edge consistency. The key axiom in our paper is edge consistency (or simply consistency,
hereafter). Suppose we have a rule ϕ that picks a flow z for a given problem (G, s, d, u). Fix an
edge (i, j) ∈ G connecting supply node i and demand node j, and define the reduced problem as
follows: the new graph is G′ = G\{e}; the supplies and demands of all the nodes other than i and
j stay the same, s′i = si − zij and d
′
j = dj − zij; and the capacities on the edges that remain stay
the same. Let z′ be the flow picked by the rule ϕ for the reduced problem (G′, s′, d′, u). The rule ϕ
is edge-consistent if z = z′ for every reduced problem G′ that can be obtained from G by omitting
an edge. Observe that z restricted to the edges in G′ is a max-flow for the reduced problem, and
edge-consistency requires that the rule not “reallocate” the flow amongst the remaining edges if
some edge is dropped from the problem and the corresponding supplies and demands are adjusted
in the obvious way.
Continuity. The mapping ϕ : (G, s, d, u) → R|E| is jointly continuous in s, d, and u. Roughly
speaking, this simply says that a rule is continuous only if small changes in supplies, demands or
edge-capacities result in small changes on the edge-flows picked by the rule.
Symmetry. Consider any permutation π of the supply nodes and a permutation σ of the demand
nodes. Define the graph G′ as follows: (i, j) ∈ G if and only if (π(i), σ(j)) ∈ G′. The supplies s′
3It is easy to check that every supplier in X \ X will transfer his entire supply in all maximum flows.
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and demands d′ are defined analogously by permuting the original supplies and demands according
to the respective permutations. Likewise for the capacities. A rule ϕ is symmetric if and only
if for every π and every σ, zij = z
′
π(j),σ(j) where z and z
′ are the outcomes of the rule for the
problems (G, s, d, u) and (G′, s′, d′, u′) respectively.
2.3 The Edge-Fair Algorithm
Given two max-flows ϕ and ϕ′ sorted in increasing order we say that ϕ lexicographically dominates
ϕ′ if the first coordinate k in which ϕ and ϕ′ are not equal is such that ϕk > ϕ
′
k. (Note that
the k-th smallest entry in the flows ϕ and ϕ′ may be on different edges.) The max-flow ϕ is
lex-optimal if it lexicographically dominates all other max-flows F∗(G, s, d, u). It is clear that a
lex-optimal flow exists and is unique.4 The edge-fair algorithm, formally described next, finds
this lex-optimal flow by solving a sequence of linear programming problems.
We fix a problem (G, s, d) such that si, dj > 0 for all i, j (clearly, if si = 0 or dj = 0 we can
ignore supplier i or demander j altogether). Let E0 := E and F0 := F
∗(G, s, d, u), the set of all
max-flows for the given problem. The edge-fair algorithm (or rule) proceeds iteratively, solving
a linear programming problem in each step. In any iteration t, it starts with a candidate set of
max-flows Ft, and a set of active edges Et, and solves the following linear programming problem:
max
ϕ∈Ft
{
λt+1
∣∣∣∣ ϕe ≥ λt+1, ∀e ∈ Et
}
.
Suppose λ∗t+1 is the optimal value of this linear programming problem. Then,
Ft+1 =
{
ϕ ∈ Ft | ϕe ≥ λ
∗
t+1 ∀e ∈ Et
}
,
and
Et+1 =
{
e ∈ Et | ϕe > λ
∗
t+1 for some ϕ ∈ Ft+1
}
.
The edges in Et\Et+1 are declared inactive, and the algorithm proceeds to the next value of t
if any active edges remain. As at least one edge becomes inactive in each step, the algorithm
terminates in O(|E|) steps.
It is often useful to think about this algorithm in a different, but equivalent way. First, observe
that any edge whose flow is fixed in every max-flow will carry exactly this amount in the outcome
of the edge-fair algorithm as well. Thus, we focus only on those edges (i, j) with the property
that 0 < ϕij < uij for some flow ϕ ∈ F
∗(G, s, d, u). In particular, from the observations in
proposition 1 on the set of Pareto Optimal solutions, we could fix zij = uij for ij ∈ G(S−,D+)
and zij = 0 for ij ∈ G(S+,D−) and remove these edges from the network. The reduced problem
now decomposes into 2 disjoint components: one in which the suppliers are rationed (and every
4The term lex-optimal flow is also used to mean a flow whose induced allocation for the suppliers (or demanders)
lex-dominates the induced allocation for the suppliers in any other flow [18, 19].
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demander gets what they ask for), and the other in which the demanders are rationed, but each
supplier sends his entire supply. As the algorithm is completely symmetric, we simply describe it
for the case of rationed demanders. In this case each supplier will be allocated his peak in every
max-flow; and any flow that respects edge-capacities while allocating each supplier his peak, while
allocating each demander no more than his peak is a max-flow. Thus, the linear programming
problem that must be solved in each step can be explicitly described: the only edges that need to
be considered are those between S+ and D−.
Maximize λt+1
subject to∑
j z
′
ij = si ∀{i ∈ S+, ij ∈ Et}∑
i z
′
ij ≤ dj ∀{j ∈ D−, ij ∈ Et}
λt+1 ≤ z
′
ij∀{ij ∈ Et}
uij ≥ z
′
ij ≥ 0
Initially, every such edge is active, and the algorithm tries to maximize the minimum amount
carried by an active edge in any max-flow.
Theorem 1 The edge fair rule is symmetric, continuous, and consistent.
Proof: Symmetry follows because the rule is invariant, by definition, to permutations of
supply nodes, demand nodes, and edge-capacities. Continuity is equally clear. Consistency is
also immediate by the definition of the algorithm: we may assume that the edge (i, j) that is
dropped to obtain the reduced problem is still present but carries a constant flow zij , where z is
the outcome chosen by the rule for the original problem. Thus, the set of feasible solutions to the
reduced problem is a subset of the set of feasible solutions to the original problem at every stage
of the algorithm: As the outcome z for the original problem is a member of both sets, it will be
chosen in both cases.
Example. We illustrate the algorithm on the problem shown in Figure 1 with 8 supply nodes
and 8 demand nodes. All edges have infinite capacity except for the edges (s7, d3) and (s8, d4),
which have capacity 0.5 each. It is clear that these two capacitated edges must carry 0.5 unit of
flow each in every max-flow, so their flow can be fixed; by consistency, we could omit these edges
from further consideration, and adjust the supplies at s7 and at s8 and the demands at d3 and at
d4 down by 0.5 unit each. Similarly, the edges (s3, d5) and (s4, d6) carry no flow in any max-flow,
and so can be omitted as well. The problem now decomposes into two components: one involving
the first 4 supply and demand nodes, where the demand nodes are rationed in any max-flow; and
the other involving the last 4 supply and demand nodes, where the supply nodes are rationed in
any max-flow.
8
3 s8
3 s7
2 s6
2 s5
3 s4
7 s3
8 s2
10 s1
2d8
2d7
4/3d6
4/3d5
12d4
12d3
12d2
12d1
Figure 1: Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition and the Edge Fair Allocation
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First consider the problem involving the first four supply and demand nodes. Each supply
node sends all its supply, whereas each demand node receives at most what it wants. The edge-fair
algorithm applied to this problem gives the following flow: first z21 = 2; then z32 = z33 = z34 =
7/3; then z44 = 3, after which z22 = 6, and finally z12 = 10. The resulting allocation for the
demanders in this problem is (12, 25/3, 7/3, 16/3); recall that demand nodes 3 and 4 also get 0.5
units of flow from suppliers s7 and s8 respectively, so the final allocation for the demand nodes
is (12, 25/3, 17/6, 35/6).
Now consider the edge-fair algorithm applied to the last 4 supply and demand nodes. Here
the supply nodes are rationed whereas the demand is exactly met. It is easy to check that the the
edge-fair rule sends a flow of 2/3 on each edge in this component so that the resulting allocation
for the supply nodes is (2, 2, 4/3, 4/3); as the last 2 supply nodes also send 0.5 units of flow to the
other component, the final allocation for these supply nodes is (2, 2, 11/6, 11/6).
To summarize, the edge-fair algorithm applied to this example results in an allocation of
(10, 8, 7, 3, 2, 2, 11/6, 11/6) for the supply nodes and (12, 25/3, 17/6, 35/6, 4/3, 4/3, 2, 2) for the de-
mand nodes. In contrast, it can be verified that the egalitarian allocation results in an allocation
of (10, 8, 7, 3, 23/12, 23/12, 23/12, 23/12) for the supply nodes, and (10, 8, 11/2, 11/2, 4/3, 4/3, 2, 2)
for the demand nodes. This also highlights an important distinction between the edge-fair allo-
cation and the egalitarian one: in our example, demand nodes 3 and 4 have identical demands,
and it is possible to give them the same allocation, as shown by the Egalitarian allocation; the
edge-fair rule, however, treats these demand nodes differently. In particular, demand node 4 is
better off under the edge-fair rule because of its improved connectivity.
3 Model 1: Agents only on nodes
In this section we consider the version of the problem where the nodes of the network are populated
by agents. Specifically, each supply node i is occupied by a supplier i and each demand node j is
occipied by a demander j. Thus, we our problem becomes one of transferring a single commodity
from a set S of suppliers to a set D of demanders using the set E of edges. The edge e has a
capacity ue that is known to all the agents. A transfer of the commodity from S to D is realized
by a flow ϕ, which specifies the amount of the commodity transferred from supplier i to demander
j using the edge (i, j) ∈ E. The flow ϕ induces an allocation vector for each supplier and each
demander as follows:
for all i ∈ S : xi(ϕ) =
∑
j∈f(i)
ϕij ; for all j ∈ D : yj(ϕ) =
∑
i∈g(j)
ϕij (3)
As we shall see in a moment, suppliers and demanders only care about their net transfers, and
not on how these transfers are distributed across the agents on the other side.
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Each supplier i has single-peaked preferences5 Ri (with corresponding indifference relation Ii)
over her net transfer xi, with peak si, and each demander j has single-peaked preferences Rj (Ij)
over her net transfer yj, with peak dj . We write R for the set of single peaked preferences over
R+, and R
S∪D for the set of preference profiles.
We think of the graph G as fixed, and focus our attention on mechanisms that elicit preferences
from the agents and maps the reported preference profile to a flow. For reasons that will be clear
later, we focus on allocation rules that are peak only: the flow (and hence the induced allocation
vector for the suppliers and demanders) depends on the reported preference profile of the agents
only through their peaks. Thus it makes sense to talk of the problem (s, d): this emphasizes the
fact that the peaks of the agents are private information whereas the other part of the problem
(specifically, the graph G and the edge capacities u) are known. To summarize: suppliers and
demanders report their peaks; the allocation rule is applied to the graph G with edge-capacities
u, and the data (s, d) where s and d are the reported peaks of the suppliers, and demanders. Our
focus will be on mechanisms in which no agent has an incentive to misreport his peak.
A mechanism is said to be strategyproof if for any graph G it is a weakly dominant strategy
for an agent to truthfully report their peak. It is group strategyproof if for any graph G it is a
weakly dominant strategy for any coalition of agents to truthfully report their peaks.
3.1 Efficiency and Equity
Pareto Optimality: A feasible net transfer (x, y) as defined in the previous section is Pareto
Optimal if there is no other allocation (x′, y′) such that every agent is weakly better off and atleast
one agent is strictly better off in it. In mathematical terms, if Ri and Ii denote the preference
and indifference relations respectively for agent i, then
{∀ i, j : x′iRixi and y
′
jRjyj} =⇒ {∀ i, j : x
′
iIixi and y
′
jIjyj} (4)
The following result shows that set of Pareto optimal transfers for peak-only rules is intimately
related to the set of max-flows.
Proposition 1 Fix the economy (G,R). Let S+, S− and D+,D− be the Gallai-Edmonds decom-
position applied to the network G with edge capacities given by u, supplies given by the peaks of
the suppliers and the demands given by the peaks of the demanders. Then:
(a) If the flow ϕ implements Pareto optimal net transfers (x, y), then:
ij ∈ G(S−,D−) =⇒ φij = uij ; ij ∈ G(S+,D+ ∪ (f(S−) ∩D−)) =⇒ φij = 0 (5)
5Writing Pi for agent i’s strict preference, we have for every xi, x
′
i: xi < x
′
i ≤ si ⇒ x
′
iPixi, and si ≤ xi < x
′
i
⇒ xiPix
′
i.
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(b) The transfers (x, y) induced by a feasible flow ϕ are Pareto optimal if and only if
x ≥ s on S+, y ≤ d on D− and xS+ = yD− − φ(S−,D−) (6)
x ≤ s on S−, y ≥ d on D+ and xS− = yD+ + φ(S−,D−) (7)
where φ(S−,D−) is the net flow from component S− to D−. From earlier discussions,
φ(S−,D−) =
∑
i∈Si,j∈D−
uij
We are particularly interested in Pareto optimal flows and transfers in which no supplier or
demander is allocated more than their peak: such solutions are Pareto optimal for any single-
peaked preferences of the agents as long as the peaks are s and d respectively. Following Bochet
et al., we call this set PO∗ and note that (x, y) ∈ PO∗ if and only if (x, y) is Pareto optimal,
x ≤ s, and y ≤ d. In particular, (x, y) ∈ PO∗ if and only if
x = s on S+, y ≤ d on D− and xS+ = yD− − φ(S−,D−) (8)
x ≤ s on S−, y = d on D+ and xS− = yD+ + φ(S−,D−) (9)
In the rest of the section, by a Pareto optimal solution we mean a flow inducing net transfers
(x, y) ∈ PO∗. We proceed now to discussions related to fairness.
No Envy: A rule (x, y) ∈ F(G, s, d, u) satisfies No Envy if for any preference profileR ∈ RS∪D
and i, j ∈ S such that xjPixi, there exists no (x
′, y′) such that
xk = x
′
k for all k ∈ S\{i, j}; yl = y
′
l for all l ∈ D and (10)
x′iPixi (11)
and a similar statement when we interchange the role of suppliers and demanders.
Equal Treatment of Equals:A rule (x, y) ∈ F(G, s, d, u) satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals
if for any preference profile R ∈ RS∪D and i, j ∈ S such that si = sj , if xj 6= xi then there exists
no (x′, y′) such that
xk = x
′
k for all k ∈ S\{i, j}; yl = y
′
l for all l ∈ D and (12)
|x′i − x
′
j| < |xj − xi| (13)
and a similar statement when we interchange the role of suppliers and demanders.
If an allocation rule always results in a Pareto optimal allocation and satisfies No Envy, then
it also satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals (Refer to Proposition 5 in Bochet et al. [5]).
The egalitarian rule of Bochet et al. [5] is a selection from the Pareto set PO∗ as is the edge-
fair allocation rule. They also show that the egalitarian rule is envy-free but the inconsistency of
the rule follows from figure 2 where we remove the node d1 from the network on the left. The
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3 s2
3 s1
2d2
2d1z11 = 2
z22 = 2
3 s1 2d1 3 s1
1 s2
2d1z11 = 1
z21 = 1
Figure 2: Inconsistency of the egalitarian rule and envy of edge fair rule
egalitarian allocation on the reduced network improves the allocation of s2 by sending 1 unit of
flow on the edge s2 − d2
We have already seen that the edge-fair rule is also consistent. But here is an exmple where
the edge-fair rule has envy. But one can show that no consistent rule is envy-free (under PO∗)
using the same example.
Lemma 2 There is no mechanism which is simultaneously envy free for agents on the nodes and
edge consistent under PO∗
Let us consider the same example as in figure 2. Suppose the mechanism is envy free: Any
envy free solution should allocate 2 units to each supplier 1 and 2. This establishes a unique edge
flow: (z11, z21, z22) = (2, 0, 2). Lets remove the edge s2 − d2 with z22 = 2 units allocation. If
this mechanism was also consistent, then on this reduced network the mechanism should have an
allocation (z11, z21) = (2, 0) on the edges. But the no-envy solution on this reduced graph would
allocate (z11, z21) = (1, 1)
Now, suppose the given mechanism is edge consistent and lets say (z11, z21, z22) = (2, 0, 2) is
an allocation from some edge consistent rule. Removing the edge s2 − d2, in the reduced graph
the allocation from an edge consistent mechanism is (z11, z21) = (2, 0) but this does not allocate
a envy free solution for the nodes on the reduced graph. As a consequence, if the mechanism is
edge consistent it cannot allocate (z11, z21, z22) = (2, 0, 2) in the original network but this is the
only envy free solution on that network. The same example also shows that any edge consistent
mechanism violates the property equal treatment of equals.
These results imply that no rule can be Pareto efficient, Envy-free and Consistent. Both
the egalitarian and edge-fair rules find Pareto efficient allocations; where they differ is that the
egalitarian rule relaxes consistency but is envy-free, but the edge-fair rule relaxes envy-freeness
but is consistent. Bochet et al. [5] show that the egalitarian rule is strategyproof; and in our
earlier paper, we show that it is in fact group strategyproof. A natural question is if the edge-fair
rule enjoys these properties as well. We answer this question in the affirmative in the next section.
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3.2 Strategic Issues
We start with a formal definition of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness. Informally,
a mechanism is strategyproof if it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each agent to reveal his
peak truthfully; and a mechanism is group strategyproof if it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for
any group of agents to reveal their peaks truthfully.
Strategyproof: A rule (x, y) on (G, s, d) is strategyproof if for all R ∈ RS∪D, i ∈ S, j ∈ D
and R′i, R
′
j ∈ R
xi(R)Rixi(R
′
i, R−i) and yj(R)Rjyj(R
′
j , R−j) (14)
Peak Group Strategyproof: A rule (x, y) on (G, s, d) is group strategyproof if for all R ∈
RS∪D, A ⊆ S ∪D and R′i ∈ R
xi(R)Rixi(R
′
A, R−A) ∀i ∈ A (15)
These properties are closely related to an invariance property that we formally define below:
Invariance: For all R ∈ RS∪D, i ∈ S and R′i ∈ R
{s[Ri] < xi(R) and s[R
′
i] ≤ xi(R)} or {s[Ri] > xi(R) and s[R
′
i] ≥ xi(R)} (16)
=⇒ xi(R
′
i, R−i) = xi(R) (17)
and a similar invariance property can be defined with respect to the demanders.
Lemma 3 For any rule that always selects an allocation (x, y) ∈ PO∗, strategyproofness and
invariance are equivalent.
Proof: First we show that, under PO∗, strategyproofness implies invariance: As the allocation
is in PO∗ we have xi ≤ si. Thus, to prove invariance we need to show that when xi < si, and
s′i ≥ xi we have x
′
i = xi. Suppose not and we have x
′
i < xi. Then agent i benefits by misreporting
his peak as si when his true peak is s
′
i, which violates strategyproofness. Similarly, if x
′
i > xi, we
can construct a profile R∗ such that x′iPi∗xi. As a PO
∗ + Strategyproof rule is peak-monotonic
and as a consequence own peak only (Bochet et al. [5]), xi(R
∗
i , R−i) = xi(R). Hence, i benefits
by sreporting s′i when his true peak is si, which violates strategyproofness again.
We now show the converse. Suppose the rule is not strategyproof. Under a PO∗ rule, xi = si
for every agent i ∈ S+, hence those agents never misreport. Every agent in i ∈ S− is such that
xi ≤ si. So, any agent who deviates and improves his allocation is such that s
′
i ≥ xi < si and
x′iPixi. But this is not possible under an invariant rule. Hence, the rule is indeed strategyproof.
As we discussed earlier, the egalitarian rule is strategyproof, but is also group strategyproof.
A natural question is if every strategyproof rule in our problem is also group strategyproof6.
6Barbera et al. [2] study environments where this is indeed the case.
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As it turns out, the answer is ”no” as shown by the following example. Consider the following
mechanism, if the report of d0 >= 5, then apply the egalitarian mechanism and if the report of
d0 < 5, follow the edge fair mechanism. This rule is clearly strategyproof. But agent d0 and
s1 can collude such that agent d0 misreports his peak as 4 (when his/her true peak is 6). This
improves the allocation of agent s1 by 1 unit, keeping the allocation of d0 to be the same.
6 s2
6 s1
4 s0
3d2
3d1
6d0
Figure 3: Invariance and GSP are not equivalent
We know from Bochet et al. [5] that strategyproofness of a rule can just be characterized by
peak monotonicity and invariance. From the above discussion, strategyproofness is characterized
by PO∗ and invariance. So, the natural question is what other additional property is needed to
make a mechanism groupstrategyproof. Next, we show that any groupstrategyproof mechanism
can be characterized by PO∗ and the following stronger invariance property:
Strong Invariance: For all R ∈ RS∪D, i ∈ S and R′i ∈ R
{s[Ri] < xi(R) and s[R
′
i] ≤ xi(R)} or {s[Ri] > xi(R) and s[R
′
i] ≥ xi(R)} (18)
=⇒ xj(R
′
i, R−i) = xj(R) ∀j ∈ S and (19)
yl(R
′
i, R−i) = yl(R) ∀l ∈ D (20)
and a similar strong invariance property can be defined with respect to the demanders.
In other words, while invariance implies that the allocation of a supplier is unchanged whenever
his peak misreport is above his allocation, strong invariance implies that the allocation of every
agent is unchanged when a particular agent misreports his peak over his current allocation.
Our main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 2 Any mechanism that always selects an allocation from PO∗ satisfies strong invari-
ance if and only if it is group strategy-proof.
Proof of theorem 2 We follow the proof technique introduced in Chandramouli & Sethura-
man [8] for the first part of the theorem PO∗, strong invariance =⇒ Peak GSP.
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Suppose such a rule is not peak group strategyprof then lets focus on a network G with the
smallest number of nodes. Suppose the true peaks of the suppliers and demanders are s and d
respectively, and suppose their respective misreports are s′ and d′. We can assume that dj > 0
for every demander j, as otherwise deleting j would result in a smaller counterexample. Fix a
coalition A of suppliers and a coalition B of demanders : note that A contains all the suppliers k
with s′k 6= sk, and B includes all demanders ℓ with d
′
ℓ 6= dℓ.
Let (x, y) and (x′, y′) be the respective allocations to the suppliers and demanders when they
report (s, d) and (s′, d′) respectively. Let S+, S−,D+,D− be the decompsition when the agents
report (s, d), and let S′+, S
′
−,D
′
+,D
′
− be the decomposition when the agents report (s
′, d′). We
shall show that when the agents report (s′, d′) rather than (s, d), the only allocation in which each
agent in A ∪B is (weakly) better off, then x′k = xk for all k ∈ A and y
′
ℓ = yℓ for all ℓ ∈ B. This
establishes the required contradiction.
Let Y ′ := D+ ∩D
′
−. If Y
′ = {∅}, then consider the set of suppliers S− ∩ S
′
+. Every supplier
i ∈ S− ∩ S
′
+ do not send flow to any demander j in D
′
+. Hence, these suppliers can send flow
to only demanders in f(S− ∩ S
′
+) ∩D
′
−. Now observe, zij = uij, z
′
ij ≤ uij when the reports are
s and s′ respectively for every agent i ∈ S− ∩ S
′
+, j ∈ f(S− ∩ S
′
+) ∩D
′
−. Hence, every supplier
i ∈ S− ∩ S
′
+ sends weakly less flow to every agent connected to him. Hence, s
′
i = x
′
i ≤ xi ≤ si.
So, we can conclude A = {∅} when Y ′ = {∅}.
We now consider the case Y ′ 6= {∅} and make observations about the suppliers X ′ := g(Y ′) ∩
S− ∩ S
′
+. Let Y
′′ := f(X ′) ∩D′− ∩D−
• For any such supplier k, s′k = x
′
k and xk ≤ sk. Also, dℓ = yℓ and y
′
ℓ ≤ d
′
ℓ for any ℓ ∈ Y
′.
• When the report is s′, every such supplier can send flow only to the demanders in Y ′ ∪ Y ′′:
this is because no link exists between agents in X ′ and demanders in D′−\{Y
′ ∪ Y ′′} and
zij = 0 ∀ ij ∈ G(S
′
+,D
′
+) in a pareto optimal allocation. Also, observe that zij ≤ uij
∀ ij ∈ G(X ′, Y ′′) and zij = uij ∀ ij ∈ G(S
′
−, Y
′). Therefore
∑
k∈X′ x
′
k ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y ′ y
′
ℓ −∑
ij∈G(S′−,Y
′) uij +
∑
ij∈G(X′,Y ′′) uij
• When the report is s, zij = uij ∀ ij ∈ G(X
′, Y ′′). The agents in Y ′ can receive flow only
from agents in X ′ and g(Y ′)∩S′−∩S−. The agents in Y
′ can receive at most
∑
ij∈G(S′−,Y
′) uij
units of flow from the suppliers g(Y ′) ∩ S′− ∩ S−. Hence, the remaining allocation has to
be supplied from X ′. Also, note that f(X ′) ⊇ Y ′. Therefore
∑
k∈X′ xk ≥
∑
ℓ∈Y ′ yℓ −∑
ij∈G(S′−,Y
′) uij +
∑
ij∈G(X′,Y ′′) uij .
Let f(S′−, Y
′) := −
∑
ij∈G(S′−,Y
′) uij +
∑
ij∈G(X′,Y ′′) uij . Finally, note that s
′
k = sk for all k 6∈ A,
and d′ℓ = dℓ for all ℓ 6∈ B. These observations first lead to∑
k∈X′
k 6∈A
sk +
∑
k∈X′
k∈A
x′k =
∑
k∈X′
k 6∈A
s′k +
∑
k∈X′
k∈A
x′k =
∑
k∈X′
x′k ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y ′
y′ℓ + f(S
′
−, Y
′) (21)
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Note that every demander ℓ in Y ′∩B receives exactly his peak allocation dℓ for a truthful report,
so for the coalition B of demanders to do weakly better in the (G, s′, d′) problem, y′ℓ = dℓ for each
such ℓ. Therefore,
∑
ℓ∈Y ′
y′ℓ =
∑
ℓ∈Y ′\B
y′ℓ +
∑
ℓ∈Y ′∩B
y′ℓ ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y ′\B
d′ℓ +
∑
ℓ∈Y ′∩B
dℓ =
∑
ℓ∈Y ′
dℓ. (22)
Finally,
∑
ℓ∈Y ′
dℓ + f(S
′
−, Y
′) =
∑
ℓ∈Y ′
yℓ + f(S
′
−, Y
′) ≤
∑
k∈X′
xk ≤
∑
k∈X′
k 6∈A
sk +
∑
k∈X′
k∈A
xk (23)
For every supplier in A to be (weakly) better off when reporting s′, we must have x′k ≥ xk for
each k ∈ X ′. Combining this with inequalities (21) and (23), we conclude that all the inequalities
in (21)-(23) hold as equations. In particular, x′k = xk for all k ∈ X
′, and y′ℓ = yℓ for ℓ ∈ Y
′.
Therefore, whether the report is s or is s′, the suppliers in X ′ send all of their flow only to the
demanders in Y ′ and Y ′′; Moreover, the edges from X ′ to Y ′′ and S′− to Y
′ are saturated and
that the demanders in Y ′ receive all of their flow only from the suppliers in X ′ and from the
saturated edges from S′− Therefore, removing the suppliers in X
′ and the demanders in Y ′ and
the saturated edges from X ′ to Y ′′ and S′− to Y
′ does not affect the allocation rule for either
problem. As we picked a smallest counterexample, Y ′ must be empty.
We now turn to the other case. Let X˜ := S+∩S
′
−. Define
˜˜Y := f(X˜)∩D−∩D
′
− and Consider
the demanders in Y˜ := f(X˜) ∩D− ∩D
′
+
• For any such demander ℓ, d′ℓ = y
′
ℓ and yℓ ≤ dℓ. Also, sk = xk and x
′
k ≤ s
′
k for any k ∈ X˜.
• When the report is s′, every such demander can receive flow from the suppliers in X˜ and
suppliers in g(Y˜ ) ∩ S− ∩ S
′
−. The supplier i ∈ X˜ send flow zij = uij to every demander
j ∈ Y˜ in the graph G(X˜, ˜˜Y ). Suppliers in S− send at most
∑
ij∈G(S−,Y˜ )
uij units of flow
to Y˜ . But note that f(X˜) ⊇ Y˜ and hence X˜ can send flow to agents in D′+\Y˜ . Therefore∑
k∈X˜ x
′
k ≥
∑
ℓ∈Y˜ y
′
ℓ −
∑
ij∈G(S−,Y˜ )
uij +
∑
ij∈G(X˜, ˜˜Y )
uij.
• When the report is s, the suppliers in X˜ send flow only to the demanders in D−, and they
can send flow only to the demanders they are connected to. so the suppliers in X˜ can send
flow only to the demanders in Y˜ ∪ ˜˜Y . The agents in X˜ can send at most
∑
ij∈G(X˜, ˜˜Y )
uij
units of flow to the agents in ˜˜Y . Also, the agents in Y˜ receive flow
∑
ij∈G(S−,Y˜ )
uij from S−
Therefore
∑
k∈X˜ xk ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y˜ yℓ −
∑
ij∈G(S−,Y˜ )
uij +
∑
ij∈G(X˜, ˜˜Y )
uij.
Lets denote f˜(S−, Y˜ ) := −
∑
ij∈G(S−,Y˜ )
uij +
∑
ij∈G(X˜, ˜˜Y )
uij.
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Finally, note that s′k = sk for all k 6∈ A, and d
′
ℓ = dℓ for all ℓ 6∈ B. Putting all this together,
we have: ∑
ℓ∈Y˜
ℓ 6∈B
dℓ +
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
ℓ∈B
d′ℓ + f˜(S−, Y˜ ) =
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
d′ℓ + f˜(S−, Y˜ ) =
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
y′ℓ + f˜(S−, Y˜ ) (24)
and ∑
ℓ∈Y˜
y′ℓ + f˜(S−, Y˜ ) ≤
∑
k∈X˜
x′k ≤
∑
k∈X˜\A
s′k +
∑
k∈X˜∩A
x′k =
∑
k∈X˜\A
sk +
∑
k∈X˜∩A
x′k. (25)
Note that every supplier k in X˜ ∩A receives exactly his peak allocation sk for a truthful report,
so for the coalition A of suppliers to do weakly better in the (G, s′, d′) problem, x′k = sk for each
such k. Thus,
∑
k∈X˜\A
sk+
∑
k∈X˜∩A
x′k =
∑
k∈X˜
sk =
∑
k∈X˜
xk ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
yℓ+f˜(S−, Y˜ ) ≤
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
ℓ 6∈B
dℓ+
∑
ℓ∈Y˜
ℓ∈B
yℓ+f˜(S−, Y˜ ) (26)
For every demander in B to be (weakly) better off, we must have y′ℓ ≥ yℓ for each ℓ ∈ Y˜ .
Combining this with inequalities (24)-(26), we conclude that all the inequalities in (24)-(26) hold
as equations. In particular, x′k = xk for all k ∈ X˜, and y
′
ℓ = yℓ for ℓ ∈ Y˜ . Therefore, whether
the report is s or is s′, the suppliers in X˜ send all of their flow only to the demanders in Y˜ and
to the demanders in ˜˜Y ; Moreover, the edges from X˜ to ˜˜Y are saturated in both problems; So are
the edges S− to Y˜ . and that the demanders in Y˜ receive all of their flow only from the suppliers
in X˜ and through the saturated edges from S− in both the problems. Therefore, removing the
suppliers in X˜ and the demanders in Y˜ and the saturated edges from X˜ to ˜˜Y and S− to Y˜ , we
do not affect the allocation rule for either problem. As we picked a smallest counterexample, X˜
must be empty.
We now establish that the decomposition does not change in a smallest counterexample. We
already know that Y ′ = ∅, which implies D′− ⊆ D−. Suppose this containment is strict so that
there is a demander j ∈ D− \D
′
−. The links from S− to j are completely saturated. As X˜ = ∅,
j receives flow only from the suppliers in S− ∩ S
′
−. Also, the flow on the edges from a supplier
i ∈ S− ∩ S
′
− to j is such that z
′
ij ≤ uij = zij . Hence, the allocation for agent j is such that,
y′j = d
′
j ≤ yj. But now note that, if j ∈ B then, d
′
j ≥ yj or if j /∈ B then y
′
j = dj ≤ yj ≤ dj .
In both the cases, we have the equality y′j = d
′
j = yj. This implies, g(j) ∩ S− ∩ S
′
+ = {∅}; The
links from S− to j is saturated in both the problems (Follows from the fact that the given rule
allocates the pareto value to the agents in both the networks, in particular y′k = d
′
k when the
reports are d′). Hence, we can remove those saturated edges and adjust the peaks of suppliers
and demanders. The adjusted demand of agent j now is d′j = 0. w.l.o.g we can skip the case
d′j = 0 as we can delete such a j to obtain the new decomposition or just place it in D−. Therefore
D′− = D−, which implies D
′
+ = D+, S
′
+ = S+, and S
′
− = S−.
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To complete the argument, let A be as defined earlier. Let A+ = A ∩ S+ and A− = A ∩ S−,
B+ = A∩D+ and B− = A∩D−. Now, for any j ∈ B+, d
′
j 6= dj implies y
′
j = d
′
j 6= dj causing j to
do worse by reporting d′j. Hence, it follows, ∀j ∈ B+, d
′
j = dj . By a similar argument, we could
establish s′j = sj∀j ∈ A+.
For any i ∈ A−, s
′
i < xi implies x
′
i ≤ s
′
i < xi, causing i to do worse by reporting s
′
i. Likewise,
any i ∈ B−, d
′
i < yi implies y
′
i ≤ d
′
i < yi, causing i to do worse by reporting d
′
i. So any improving
coalition A must be such that s′i ≥ xi for all i ∈ A− and d
′
i ≥ yi for all i ∈ B−.
Now, we use the strong invariance property of the rule to conclude the result. Partition the
agents in A− = As ∪ Ax where As := {xi = si|i ∈ A−} and Ax := {xi < si|i ∈ A−}. Lets start
with an agent i ∈ As, such an agent reports s
′
i > xi = si and receives x
′
i = si. Now, consider
the alternate set of reports such that s′′j = s
′
j for all agents j 6= i and s
′′
i = si and denote the
corresponding network by G(S′′,D′′). Strong invariance property implies that when the peak
report s′ii ≥ x
′
i = si then the allocation profile of the agents remains the same in the networks
G(S′,D′) and G(S′′,D′′). Hence, we can find a smaller counterexample by removing i from A−.
Hence, we can remove all the agents from As and still find a smaller counterexample. Hence, we
can assume the smallest counterexample As = {∅}.
On similar lines, strong invariance property also implies that when an agent i with xi < si
misreports such that s′i > xi then x
′
i = xi ∀ i ∈ S. Hence, applying this argument for each agent
iteratively, we can conclude that when the set of agents in Ax inflate their peaks, the allocation
does not change i.e. x′i = xi ∀ i ∈ S. Hence, no agent improves his allocation under this rule,
concluding the result.
Now, we turn to prove the other direction of the result i.e. any rule that is PO∗ and peak
GSP is strongly invariant. We discuss the result only for the suppliers, by symmetry a similar
reasoning follows for the demanders. Suppose such a rule is not strongly invariant. Since agents in
S+ receive their peak, strong invariance property needs to be discussed only in the context of the
agents in S− where xi ≤ si. Now, consider an agent i ∈ S− such that xi < si. Consider a report by
agent i such that s′i ≥ xi. From Lemma 3 it follows that PO
∗ + strategyproof implies invariance.
Hence, x′i = si. Furthermore, it follows from the earlier discussion that the decomposition and
maximum flow does not change in this new problem. Hence,
∑
k∈S−
xk =
∑
k∈S−
x′k. Suppose
x′k = xk ∀ k ∈ S− then we are done. Suppose, x
′
k 6= xk for some agent k ∈ S−, then there exists
at least one agent j such that sj ≥ x
′
j > xj (agent j improves the allocation). Thus, the pair of
agents i and j represent a colluding group who can deviate and (weakly) improve the allocation
which contradicts the peak GSP property of the rule.
Corollary 1 The edge-fair rule is group strategyproof.
Proof. It is clear that the edge-fair rule always picks an allocation from PO∗. By Theorem ??,
the result follows if we show that the rule satisfies strong invariance. Following the arguments
in the proof of that Theorem, it is enough to consider an agent i ∈ S− such that xi < si and
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s′i ≥ xi. In this case, the decomposition and maximum flow does not change, and the overall
allocation does not change either: all the breakpoints in the edge-fair algorithm for the two cases
are identical.
Note that the Egalitarian mechanism is group strategyproof for the same reason. This char-
acterization identifies a class of peak group strategyproof mechanisms.
3.3 Ranking
One notion of fairness is that suppose two agents with different peaks have identical connections,
then the agent with higher peak should have higher net allocation. This is true for the uniform
rule where there is only 1 type of divisible good. This can be formalized in the following way for a
general bipartite graph discussed here: ( A similar statement can be made about the demanders)
1. Ranking (RK) : si ≤ sj =⇒ xi ≤ xj∀ i, j such that f(i) = f(j)
2. Ranking* (RK*): si ≤ sj =⇒ si − xi ≤ sj − xj ∀i, j such that f(i) = f(j)
3. more edges more preference
We start with a proof of statement (i). Suppose xi > xj, we show a transfer from agent
i to agent j is possible and contradicts the lexicographic solution on the edges. Construct a
new solution x′ such that z′kl = zkl ∀ k ∈ S\{i, j}, l ∈ f(k), z
′
il = z
′
jl =
zil+zjl
2 ∀ l ∈ f(i).
The allocation x′ is clearly feasible and x does not lexicographic dominate x′. Hence, we arrive
at a contradiction. Using the similar idea of routing the flows from agent i to agent j and by
contradiction we can prove statement (ii).
3.4 Extensions of Uniform Rule
Both Egalitarian and Edge fair are extensions of the uniform rule whereas edge fair is a consistent
extension of the uniform rule.
4 Model 2: Agents on Edges
As in Section 3, we consider the problem of transferring a single commodity from the set S of
suppliers to the set D of demanders using a set E of edges: each edge e = (i, j) links a distinct
supplier-demanded pair. However, here we think of the supplier and demander nodes as passive,
whereas each edge e is controlled by a distinct agent who has single-peaked preferences Re over
the amount of flow on edge e. We think of the “peak” ue of his preference relation as the capacity
of the associated edge. We write R for the set of single peaked preferences over R+, and R
E
for the set of preference profiles. Transfer of the commodity is allowed between supplier i and
demander j only if (i, j) ∈ E. We let G = (S ∪D,E) be the natural bipartite graph.
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Figure 4: Every Pareto flow does not allocate a maximum flow
As before we focus our attention on peak only mechanisms: in a such a mechanism, the flow
depends on the preferences of the agents only through their peaks, so we could simply ask each
agent e to report their peak ue. We assume that the supplies si and demands dj are fixed, and
the only varying quantity are the reported peaks (equivalently, edge-capacities).
Pareto flows. The set of Pareto efficient allocations can be complicated because of the peaks
of the edge-agents. For example, suppose there are two suppliers {a, b}, two demanders {c, d},
and edges {(a, c), (a, d), (b, d)}. Suppose all peaks are 1. Then the flow given by sending 1 unit
of flow along the edge (a, d) is Pareto optimal; as is the flow given by sending a unit along each
of the edges (a, c) and (b, d). In the latter flow 2 units are sent from the supply to demand nodes
whereas only 1 unit is transferred in the former.
In contrast to model 1, therefore, it is possible that a Pareto optimal flow does not result in
a maximum-flow from supply to demand nodes. For that reason, we assume that the planner
implements a max-flow in the given problem (G, s, d, u), and we consider the question of how this
max-flow is distributed across the edge-agents. In other words, we focus on the fair division of a
max-flow, interpreting max-flow as a design constraint. Let F be the set of max-flows.
Restricting ourselves only to max-flows, it is easy to see that the Pareto set is convex: the
average of any two max-flows is itself a max-flow. In contrast to model 1, any change in flow
along an edge affects the agent’s utility directly; in model 1, because the agents were located at
the nodes, it is possible for different edge-flows to give the same allocation to the set of agents.
This implies that every element of F is a Pareto allocation.
It is natural to try to formulate this “edge”-flow problem as a bipartite rationing problem
on an auxiliary graph. For example, consider the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for the given
network (G, s, d, u), and suppose the partitions are S+, S− for the suppliers, and D+,D− for the
demanders. From the GE decomposition, every edge between S− and D− carries flow equal to
capacity, so their allocation if fixed in all solutions in F ; likewise for all edges between S+ and
D+. This suggests the following idea: create a bipartite graph with one node on the left for each
edge, and one node on the right for each element of S+ ∪ D+; each edge that still remains is
incident to either S+ or D+, but not both; moreover, the given problem is a rationing problem
in the sense that the nodes on the right must be fully allocated. Thus it appears that we have
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Figure 5: Absence of Lorenz Dominance element in Model 2
rewritten the flow problem as a bipartite rationing problem of the sort considered in Section 3.
That this analogy must be wrong is implied by the following result.
Proposition 2 There is no Lorenz Dominant allocation among the edge flows in the set F
Proof. Consider the network of Figure 5. The actual network is shown in Figure (a) and the
lexicographic solution is shown in (b). However, the solution φc := {z11 = 1.4, z12 = 1.6, z21 =
3, z22 = 3.1} is also a maximum-flow; the lex-solution does not dominate this flow, nor is it
dominated by this one.
Remark. If we draw the bipartite graph suggested in the discussion before the statement of
the proposition, and treat it as a bipartite rationing problem, we find that edges (1, 1) and (2, 1)
will carry a flow of 1.5 and 3.05 units each, and this exceeds the total demand at D1. These
implied “side-constraints” are not accounted for in translating the given problem to a bipartite
rationing problem.
Allocation Rules. We can apply the edge-fair rule discussed earlier on this model as well. The
edge-fair rule finds a lex-optimal max-flow. It is clear that the rule is also edge consistent. Our
next result shows that every edge-consistent rule is also group strategyproof.
Theorem 3 Fix a graph G with the supply vector s and demand vector d. Suppose we have an
allocation rule that maps reports of edge-capacities to a flow. Every edge-consistent allocation rule
is group strategyproof.
Proof. Consider a coalition of agents A = {e ∈ E|u′e 6= ue}, i.e., they misreport their true peaks.
Let the misreported profile be denoted by R′ ∈ R|E| and the resulting network byG′. Note that the
edge-fair rule always results in an allocation z ≤ u, hence any agent e ∈ A should report u′e ≥ ze;
otherwise, z′e ≤ u
′
e < ze and the agent e is worse off in profile R
′. Let B := {e ∈ A|ze = ue}.
The agents in B should have the allocation z′e = ue when the reports are R
′ as every such agent
received their peak allocation in profile R. Consider the graph G \ B by removing the agents in
B to form the reduced graph (G \B, sG\B, dG\B , u
′), where sG\B, dG\B are the adjusted peaks of
supply and demand nodes respectively after fixing the flow on the agents in B.
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By edge-consistency of the rule, the allocation z′e = z
′
e(−B) for all e ∈ G \B.
From the discussion above, the report of every agent e ∈ G\B is such that c′ij ≥ zij . Also,
note that zij < uij ∀ ij ∈ G\B.
By increasing the capacity of an unsaturated edge, the total value of the maximum flow does
not change and the bottleneck points remain the same when the edge fair rule is applied to
components (G\B, sG\B , dG\B , c
′) and (G\B, sG\B , dG\B , c). Hence, every agent ij ∈ A receives
the allocation z′ij = zij .
We next turn to equity properties of allocations and allocation rules. Given that different
edges may connect possibly different suppliers and demanders who may have supply or demand
different amounts of the commodity, one has to be careful in formulating these notions. Following
Bochet et al. [5], we formulate these properties for a pair of agents (equivalently, edges). In general
these properties take the following form: Fix a problem (G, s, d, u), and consider the allocation z
given by a rule ϕ. For every pair of edges e and e′, fix the flows on all edges other than e and e′
and ask if there is a “better” feasible flow in F .
An allocation is envy-free if whenever e prefers ze′ to ze (for some agents e and e
′), there is
no other allocation zˆ ∈ {z′ ∈ F | z′f = zf , ∀f 6= e, e
′ } such that e prefers zˆ to z. An allocation
z satisfies equal treatment of equals (ETE) if for each e and e′ with ue = ue′ , there is no other
allocation zˆ ∈ {z′ ∈ F | z′f = zf , ∀f 6= e, e
′ } with |zˆe − zˆe′ | < |ze − ze′ |.
The following result shows the relationship between these two properties.
Proposition 3 Consider the problem (G, s, d, u) and an allocation rule z that makes a selection
from the Pareto set F . If z is envy-free it satisfies ETE.
Proof. We mimic the proof in Bochet et al. [5] here. Suppose the rule z violates ETE, we would
like to show it violates No Envy or the flow is /∈ PO∗. Fix a profile RE and two edge agents
e and e′ such that ue[Re] = ue′ [Re′ ] = c
∗ and suppose there exists z′ satisfying the definition
above . Now, we have that, z′e + z
′
e′ = ze + ze′ because z and z
′ coincide on E\{e, e′}. Assume
without loss ze(R) < ze′(R), then only two cases are possible: ze(R) < z
′
e ≤ z
′
e′ < ze′(R) or
ze(R) < z
′
e′ ≤ ze < ze′(R).
Assume first case: c∗ ≥ ze′(R) implies a violation of No Envy. Now in case (ii), the allocation
z′′e =
ze+z′e
2 ∀ij ∈ E is such that z
′′
e ∈ PO
∗ and we are in case (i) again.
By construction, the edge-fair rule selects a maximum flow allocation from the Pareto set. The
edge-fair rule also finds an envy-free allocation. Define the set of agents A := {e|e ∈ E, ze > 0},
B := {e|e ∈ E, ze = 0}, E = A ∪ B. If ze > 0 under the edge fair rule, then the agent e carries
a positive flow in some maximum flow solution. Similarly, e ∈ B do not carry a positive flow in
any maximum flow solution. So even if zeRe′ze′ for some e
′ ∈ B, e /∈ B, there is no maximum
flow solution in which ze′ > 0 to possibly redistribute and improve the allocation of agent e
′. On
the other hand, e′, e ∈ A implies e is in a higher bottleneck set than e′ since the allocation rule
is monotone. Suppose, there is envy through the solution z′, consider the solution z
′+z
2 , which is
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still feasible because the set F is convex. This is a contradiction to the earlier obtained solution
of the LP at the step when e′ was a bottleneck. Hence, edge fair satisfies no envy in this model
thus treats equals equally.
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